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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 18-2700
___________
JOHN C. BERKERY, SR.,
Appellant
v.
MELVIN ROSS GUDKNECHT
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-17-cv-05574)
District Judge: Honorable Gerald J. Pappert
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 14, 2019
Before: CHAGARES, BIBAS and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 26, 2019)
___________
OPINION*
___________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant John Berkery appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint. For the reasons detailed below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
Berkery filed a complaint against Melvin Gudknecht, alleging that Gudknecht defamed him in his autobiography. Gudknecht published a book entitled Working on the
Edge, which recounted his career working for the United States Organized Crime Strike
Force. The book contained a passage in which Gudknecht said that Berkery was a member
of the K&A Gang and had close ties with various other criminal organizations. In his
federal complaint, Berkery claimed that all of these assertions were false.
The District Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). The Court noted that in two previous (unsuccessful) defamation actions challenging similar publications, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court had
concluded that Berkery was a limited-purpose public figure with respect to his criminal
past. Relying on the doctrine of issue preclusion, the District Court concluded that Berkery
was therefore a limited-purpose public figure for purposes of this action. Thus, the Court
ruled, Berkery was required to plead that Gudknecht had acted with actual malice. In his
complaint, Berkery claimed that he did not need to plead actual malice; after rejecting that
legal argument, the Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice to Berkery’s re-filing
with additional factual allegations. The Court set a deadline of August 23, 2018, for Berkery to re-file. Instead of filing an amended complaint, Berkery filed a notice of appeal.
Berkery has elected to stand on his complaint as drafted, and we thus have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d
2

Cir. 1976) (per curiam). Section 1915(e)(2) provides that a district court “shall dismiss the
case at any time if the court determines that” the case “fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). We review an order dismissing a complaint
pursuant to § 1915 for failure to state a claim under the same de novo standard of review
that we use to review an order dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See generally Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case. As the District Court
explained, the Appellate Division previously ruled that Berkery is a limited-purpose public
figure with respect to his criminal background. See Berkery v. Kinney, 936 A.2d 1010,
1014-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). “When a prior case has been adjudicated in a
state court, federal courts are required by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 to give full faith and credit to
the state judgment”; when doing so, federal courts “apply the same preclusion rules as
would the courts of that state.” Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F.3d 186,
189 (3d Cir. 1993). Thus, New Jersey’s principles of issue preclusion control. See Del.
River Port Auth. v. Fraternal Order of Police, 290 F.3d 567, 573 (3d Cir. 2002). Under
New Jersey law, issue preclusion bars relitigation if (1) the issue is identical; (2) the issue
was actually litigated in a prior proceeding; (3) the prior court issued a final judgment on
the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5)
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the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to
the earlier proceeding. Id.
Each of those requirements is satisfied here. The Appellate Division confronted the
same issue we face here—whether Berkery, by virtue of his criminal background, qualifies
as a limited-purpose public figure—and, after analyzing the issue in depth, concluded that
he did. See Berkery, 936 A.2d at 1013-15. That determination, which is now final, was
fundamental to the Appellate Division’s decision: the Court ruled that, as a limited-purpose
public figure, Berkery was required to show that the defendants had acted with actual malice, and that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment because he had failed to
do so. See id. at 1014-15. Indeed, in a subsequent case, the Appellate Division recognized
the preclusive effect of its ruling that Berkery is a limited-purpose public figure, explaining
that the Court had “conclusively settled this issue.” Berkery v. Estate of Stuart, 988 A.2d
1201, 1206 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that principles of issue preclusion
dictate that Berkery be treated as a limited-purpose public figure in this case. This ruling
is, in effect, fatal to his action. When a limited-purpose public figure sues for defamation,
he must show that the statements were made with “actual malice.” Marcone v. Penthouse
Int’l Magazine For Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1087 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)); see also Biro v. Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 545-46 (2d
Cir. 2015). Actual malice is present when a statement is made “with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.
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As the District Court noted, Berkery did not attempt to plead actual malice, stating affirmatively that “actual malice need not be shown.” Compl. ¶ 17. Thus, the District Court did
not err in dismissing the complaint. Moreover, while the District Court provided Berkery
with an opportunity to amend his complaint to address this deficiency, he declined to do
so.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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